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Background: Cognitive bias modification (CBM) protocols have been developed to help establish the causal role of
biased cognitive processing in maintaining psychopathology and have demonstrated therapeutic benefits in a
range of disorders. The current study evaluated a cognitive bias modification training paradigm designed to target
interpretation biases (CBM-I) associated with obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD).
Methods: We evaluated the impact of CBM-I on measures of interpretation bias, distress, and on responses to three
OC stressor tasks designed to tap the core belief domains of Importance of Thoughts/Control, Perfectionism/
Intolerance of Uncertainty, and Contamination/Estimation of Threat in a selected sample of community members
reporting obsessive compulsive (OC) symptoms (N = 89).
Results: Participants randomly assigned to the Positive condition evidenced a change in interpretation bias
towards more positive and less negative OC-relevant interpretations following CBM-I compared to participants
assigned to the Control condition. Importantly, a positivity bias was not observed for foil scenarios unrelated to the
core OC belief domains. Further, participants in the Positive condition reported less distress and urge to neutralize
following an OC stressor task designed to tap Importance of Thoughts/Control. No significant difference emerged
on the indices of behavioural response to the OC stressor tasks. Severity of OC symptoms did not moderate the
effects of positive CBM-I training.
Conclusions: CBM-I appears effective in selectively targeting OC beliefs. Results need to be replicated in clinical
samples in order for potential therapeutic benefit to be demonstrated.
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Obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) is a disorder cha-
racterised by intrusive, repetitive thoughts (obsessions),
which typically lead to engagement in either mental or
behavioural compulsions designed to alleviate associated
anxiety and distress. Epidemiology studies have esti-
mated that the lifetime prevalence of OCD ranges from
2% to 3.8% [1-3]. The quality of life of persons with
OCD is severely affected [4]. Left untreated, OCD has a
chronic course [5]. The treatment of choice is cognitive-
behavioural therapy (CBT), but with a response rate of
only 50% when drop-out rates are considered [6], there
is a clear need for treatment innovation.* Correspondence: alishia.williams@unsw.edu.au
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distribution, and reproduction in any mediumOne promising area of research that may advance
OCD treatments focuses on the role of implicit cogni-
tion and biases in the development and maintenance of
the disorder. Cognitive biases refer to the tendency to
preferentially process negative or threatening informa-
tion, either through increased allocation of attention re-
sources (attentional bias) or via rapid assignment of
negative or threatening appraisals to ambiguous infor-
mation (interpretive bias) – for an overview see: [7]. Ex-
tensive research has established that anxious individuals
preferentially allocate their attention towards threat-
related information [8] and interpret ambiguous in-
formation in a negative manner [9]. However, leading
authorities in the field have noted that although promi-
nent cognitive theories of anxiety implicate attentional
and interpretive biases in the onset and maintenance ofd Central Ltd. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the
/creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use,
, provided the original work is properly cited.
Williams and Grisham BMC Psychiatry 2013, 13:256 Page 2 of 9
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-244X/13/256anxiety disorders [10] the causal nature of these biases
remains to be established in all disorders [11].
Accordingly, there has been a recent surge in inter-
national interest in the application of novel experimental
methodologies to establish the causal role of biased cog-
nitive processes in maintaining anxiety disorders. These
developments have underscored the need for greater un-
derstanding of disorder-specific biases in OCD. Pro-
minent cognitive models of OCD assert that intrusive
thoughts are experienced by most people, but develop
into obsessions when appraised as posing a threat for
which the individual is personally responsible. Thus by
its very nature, OCD is an ideal candidate disorder to
examine pathological cognitive biases. Whereas several
studies have evaluated the presence of attentional biases
as a form of aberrant information processing in OCD
[12-14], other research has focused on interpretive bia-
ses. An emphasis on interpretive biases is consistent
with leading cognitive models of OCD, which propose
that it is the interpretation of an unwanted intrusive
thought or image that leads to anxiety, distress, and the
concomitant behavioural acts that are the defining
features of the disorder [15]. Substantial correlational
evidence supports the association between negative
interpretations of intrusive thoughts and OC symptoms
[16,17]. However, identification of the presence of cogni-
tive biases is insufficient to conclude that these biases
causally contribute to psychological dysfunction [18].
Experimental paradigms are required to establish the
causal role of cognitive biases in symptom expression
and maintenance in OCD. One way to test causal hy-
potheses is to target biased attention and appraisals via
cognitive bias modification (CBM) paradigms. CBM is a
cognitive experimental methodology that modifies biases
via training conditions in which participants are exposed
to a series of stimuli designed to manipulate processing
relevant to psychopathology. CBM procedures are either
designed to modify an interpretive bias (CBM-I) or an
attentional bias (CBM-A). Both types of CBM paradigms
have demonstrated efficacy in modifying cognitive biases
implicated in the anxiety disorders and the resultant
change in selective information processing has been
shown to impact upon clinically relevant symptoms [18].
For example, CBM techniques have proven to be effect-
ive in reducing clinical symptoms and dysfunction across
a range of disorders including depression [19-21], gene-
ralised anxiety disorder [22], and social anxiety [23,24].
Importantly, research has demonstrated that the induced
adaptive processing biases lead to subsequent reductions
in emotional reactivity to subsequent stressor tasks
[19,25,26] as well as reductions in symptoms [27].
Evidence is emerging for the impact of CBM-I tech-
niques in OCD. Clerkin and Teachman [28] employed a
CBM-I paradigm to evaluate whether participants highin OC symptoms could be trained to adopt healthier
interpretations. They tested whether this training in-
fluenced participants’ later responses to an OC-stressor
task (a task designed to elicit distress and urges to en-
gage in a compulsion or neutralisation behaviour). Con-
sistent with expectations, high OC participants in the
positive (versus control) training condition endorsed
healthier OC-relevant interpretations and beliefs follo-
wing training, and reported (at trend level) less negative
emotion during the subsequent stressor task after con-
trolling for baseline negative affect.
These results offer support for the cognitive model of
OCD, which emphasises the importance of appraisals of
intrusive thoughts, and provide initial evidence that mo-
difying interpretation biases in a high OC population
may have downstream effects on emotional and phy-
siological responses to OC stressors. The inclusion of a
behavioural measure in this study was important to pro-
vide a robust test of the effects of CBM on emotional
consequences that is not confounded by the potential
for self-report bias [29]. However, OCD experts have
identified six core appraisals implicated in OCD symp-
tom maintenance: 1) Tolerance for Uncertainty (e.g., ‘It
is essential for me to consider all possible outcomes of a
situation’), 2) Threat Estimation (e.g., ‘I often think things
around me are unsafe’), 3) Control of Thoughts (e.g.,
‘I should be able to rid my mind of unwanted thoughts’),
4) Importance of Thoughts (e.g., ‘Having nasty thoughts
means I am a terrible person’), 5) Responsibility (e.g., ‘If
my actions could have even a small effect on a potential
misfortune, I am responsible for the outcome’) and 6) Per-
fectionism (e.g., ‘If I don’t do a job perfectly, people won’t
respect me’). Development of OC-stressor tasks to index
anxiety corresponding to each of these domains is ne-
cessary to provide a comprehensive evaluation of the
downstream effect of CBM on behaviour. Inclusion of a
stressor task in this type of research is also important
given diathesis-stress conceptualisations that propose
negative cognitive biases are latent vulnerability factors
that only directly influence symptoms once activated by
a disorder-relevant stressor [11]. Further, Clerkin and
Teachman [28] employed a student sample all high in
OC symptoms. In the absence of a low OC symptom or
healthy control group, the specificity of the effect to OC
symptoms remains unknown. It is possible that this form
of CBM training could have generic positive effects irre-
spective of OC symptom level.
Therefore the aims of the current study were to repli-
cate and extend the findings of Clerkin and Teachman
by evaluating a CBM-I training paradigm in a selected
sample of community members with varying levels of
OC symptoms. We aimed to assess the impact of CBM-I
on measures of interpretation bias, distress, and on res-
ponses to three behavioural tasks designed to tap the
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Perfectionism/Intolerance of Uncertainty, and Contami-
nation/Estimation of Threat.
On the basis of previous finding, we predicted that
participants assigned to the Positive CBM-I training
condition would evidence a change in interpretation bias
towards more positive and less negative OC-relevant in-
terpretations compared to participants assigned to the
Control CBM-I training condition. Further, we predicted
that participants in the Positive CBM-I training con-
dition would report less distress and evidence a more
adaptive response (defined in relation to each task) to
the behavioural tasks compared to participants in the
CBM-I Control condition. Finally, we hypothesized that
participants with high levels of OC symptoms in the
Positive CBM-I training condition would demonstrate
the greatest change in interpretation bias.
Method
Ethical approval
The study was approved by the Human Research Ethics
Committee of the University of New South Wales
(HREC; HC11505), Sydney.
Participants
Selected community participants were recruited through
the following advertisement placed on local mental
health and general community websites: Are you some-
one bothered by intrusive thoughts or images that you
find difficult to control? Do you find yourself repeating
certain behaviours that you find difficult to resist? Re-
searchers at the University of New South Wales are seek-
ing participants for a study investigating beliefs, imagery,
and behaviour. Potential participants who responded to
this advertisement were provided a secure link to access
the online informed consent and pre-screening question-
naires. It is routine practice in our labs to screen for ex-
clusion criteria for study integrity and ethical reasons.
Exclusion criteria included: severe depression (PHQ9 > 19)
or suicidal ideation (PHQ9 item 9 > 1), endorsement
of substance abuse, a reported history of psychosis,
and age < 18 years. Eligible participants completed the
battery of baseline questionnaires (DOCS, OBQ) online.
Measures
Dimensional obsessive-compulsive scale
(DOCS; [30]). The DOCS is a 20-item measure that
assesses the four dimensions of OC symptoms most re-
liably found in structural research of OCD symptom
(Contamination, Responsibility, Unacceptable Thoughts,
and Symmetry). Items are rated on a 5-point scale with
total scores ranging from 0 to 80. The DOCS items were
constructed based on evidence that obsessions and com-
pulsions occur on a continuum of severity and thereforeare suitable for both non-clinical and clinical respon-
dents [30]. The DOCS has been validated in clinical and
non-clinical samples and demonstrates excellent psycho-
metric properties [30]. Mean scores in the clinical OCD
validation sample were 30.03 (SD = 15.49) and in the
healthy student sample were 11.93 (SD = 9.87). These
mean values were used in the current study to refer to
high DOCS and low DOCS, respectively. The recom-
mended clinical cut-off score in classifying OCD patients
from nonclinical adults is 18 [30]. Cronbach’s alpha was
.94 in the current sample.
The obsessive beliefs questionnaire-TRIP
The OBQ-TRIP (20-item version; [31]) is a factor-
analytically derived brief version of the original Obses-
sive Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG)
44-item version [17]. Each of the 20 items designed to
measure cognitions and beliefs central to OCD are rated
on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = disagree very much
to 7 = agree very much). The OBQ-TRIP-20 correlates
well with the full OBQ-TRIP and demonstrates good
internal consistency, Cronbach’s alpha = .77-.82 [17].
Cronbach’s alpha was .95 in the current sample.
Patient health questionnaire
The PHQ9 [32] is a self-report questionnaire consistent
with the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for major depressive
disorder. A four-point frequency scale (0 = not at all,
3 = nearly every day) is used to rate each of the nine
items. Higher scores are indicative of more severe depres-
sion symptoms (0–9 = normal, 10–14 = mild, 15–19 =
moderate, 20–23 = severe, and 24–27 = very severe). The
PHQ-9 demonstrates good psychometric properties [32].
Cronbach’s alpha was .86 in the current sample.
OC bias index
To obtain an index of interpretation bias both before
and after CBM-I training, the bias measure of Clerkin
and Teachman [28] was employed. Participants were
first exposed to 10 scenarios with a missing letter in the
final word of the sentence. Each scenario remained am-
biguous in nature even after completion of the word
fragment (e.g., ‘You are driving to visit friends who live
several hours away. Outside, it begins to rain and you
are careful to drive the speed limit. You think about the
importance of driving s_fely’). In this example, the letter
‘a’ would be required to complete the word stem of
‘safely’. Following the filler task (below), participants
were then randomly presented with 4 sentences and re-
quired to rate how similar each was to the meaning of
the scenario they previously imagined themselves in (1 =
very different in meaning to 4 very similar in meaning).
Each sentence corresponded with four different inter-
pretations, none of which was worded identically to the
Williams and Grisham BMC Psychiatry 2013, 13:256 Page 4 of 9
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-244X/13/256sentence in the paragraph they had previously imagined
themselves in. OC-Positive scenarios were consistent
with a response that challenges the core maladaptive be-
lief (e.g., ‘As you drive down the road, you think your
chances of getting into an accident are low because you
are being so cautious’) whereas OC-Negative scenarios
were those consistent with a response that reinforces the
core maladaptive belief (e.g., ‘As you drive down the road,
you worry that you’ll accidentally crash your car even
though you aren’t speeding’). Foil scenarios were inclu-
ded to assess for a general interpretation bias. Foil Posi-
tive scenarios were positive, but unrelated to core OC
maladaptive beliefs (e.g., ‘As you drive down the road,
you are looking forward to visiting your friend’) and Foil
Negative scenarios were negative, but also unrelated to
OC beliefs (e.g., ‘As you drive down the road, you are not
looking forward to visiting your friend’). Cronbach’s alpha
for the indices ranged from .68 to .79.
The positive and negative affect schedule
(PANAS; [33]). The 10 item negative affect score was
used to asses for state negative affect at baseline and fol-
lowing the CBM-I training task. Cronbach’s alpha was .90
in the current sample.
Filler task
Participants were asked to rate the pleasantness of 60
neutral images taken from the International Affective
Picture System [34] and piloted in Grisham, Becker,
Williams, Whitton, and Makkar (unpublished). The im-
ages were displayed using Powerpoint after completion
of CBM-I training to increase the believability of the cover
story (that the researchers were interested in imagery)
and to minimize any potential mood effects of training
condition.
Behavioural tasks
Three behavioural tasks were designed for the current
study to provide an objective index of the effect of
CBM-I training on emotional vulnerability. The first
task was based on a thought-action fusion induction
[35] employed in a number of experimental studies
[28,36-38] to index Importance of Thoughts/Control.
Participants were first instructed to type the name of an
important person who is currently in the participant’s
life in the space provided on the computer screen. The
subsequent screen embedded the loved-one’s name in
the following sentence ‘Now imagine that (loved-one’s
name) has been in a car accident’. This information was
presented on the computer screen for 30 s and then
participants were asked to rate on a scale of 0 = ‘not at
all’ to 100 = ‘Extremely’ the level of distress associated
with the target thought and the degree to which they
were actively attempting to suppress the information.Participants were also given the option to delete the
sentence from the computer screen. An as index of Per-
fectionism/Intolerance of Uncertainty participants were
asked to write a summary of the study procedures to be
provided to the next participant. Participants were given
only 45 seconds to enter their text response (pilot tes-
ting demonstrated that at least 90 seconds was required
to adequately complete this task). Participants were then
asked if they were confident with the accuracy of infor-
mation they had provided and given the option to add
additional text to their response. As an index of Conta-
mination/Estimation of Threat, participants were asked
to use disinfectant wipes to clean the computer key-
board and mouse under the premise that the computer
space was a shared lab facility and that it was a University
health and safety regulation requirement. The researcher
covertly recorded the amount of time each participant
spent cleaning the keyboard and counted the number of
disinfectant wipes used.
Procedure
Following completion of the baseline screening and
questionnaires, eligible participants were then contacted
by a research assistant to arrange the 1.5 hr laboratory
session at which time they were allocated (based on the
pre-defined randomisation sequence) to Condition and
completed 1) the baseline mood measure (PANAS), 2)
the baseline Scenario Bias Measure, 3) the filler task, 4)
the CBM-I training task, 5) the filler task, 6) the post-
training training mood measure (PANAS), the post-
training Scenario Bias Measure, the OBQ-TRIP, and
finally the behavioural tasks. All participants then un-
derwent a funneled debriefing process to ascertain suspi-
cion regarding any aspects of the study.
CBM-I training task
The CBM-I training task was based on existing protocols
[28,39] that have demonstrated efficacy in inducing in-
terpretation biases by resolving the ambiguity of po-
tentially threatening information in a positive manner.
Based on the methodology of Clerkin and Teachman
[28] participants were asked to read and imagine them-
selves in various scenarios that could potentiate a ne-
gative OC interpretation. Scenarios were based on the
individual items of the OBQ-44 [17] and tapped the
broad belief domains of Tolerance for Uncertainty,
Threat Estimation, Control of Thoughts, Importance of
Thoughts, Responsibility and Perfectionism. In the cur-
rent study, all scenarios were first pilot tested by obtai-
ning ratings from 11 clinical psychologists specializing in
the treatment of anxiety disorders and OCD. Each sce-
nario was rated in terms of how well it related to the
specific concept loading on each of the six belief domains
on a scale of 1 = extremely poorly – 5 = extremely well.






(n = 41) (n = 37)
Mean (SE) Mean (SE)
DOCS Total 12.97 (12.25) 15.93 (11.60)
OBQ-TRIP 65.65 (29.27) 62.89 (26.05)
PHQ9 3.51 (4.28) 3.91 (3.69)
PANAS Negative (Baseline) 1.47 (.56) 1.45 (.57)
PANAS Negative (Post-training) 1.26 (.37) 1.28 (.37)
Note: DOCS = Dimensional Obsessive Compulsive Scale; OBQ –TRIP =
Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire; PHQ9 = Patient Health Questionnaire –
Depression; PANAS = Positive Negative Affective Schedule – Negativity Score.
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with modified items resulting in a final dataset of 164 sce-
narios. An example requiring a participant to resolve the
ambiguity of a scenario tapping Threat Estimation (OBQ
item: Avoiding serious problems, for example, illness or
accidents, requires constant effort on my parts) by se-
lecting the missing letter to complete the sentence is:
‘You are riding the bus home from work. The passenger be-
side you sneezes so you offer them a tissue. You think to
yourself that offering a tissue was a behaviour that was
k_nd/ r_sky’ (requiring the participant to enter the letter ‘i’
to form the word ‘kind’ in the positive condition or to
form the word ‘risky’ in the control condition). The sce-
nario completion task was followed by a comprehension
question to ensure the participant had processed the
meaning of the sentence ‘Are you pleased that you offered
a stranger a tissue?’ (YES/NO). In the Positive condition
every training scenario had a positive resolution and in
the Control condition half the scenarios had a positive
resolution while the remaining scenarios had a negative
resolution. Therefore a specific learning contingency was
established between the ambiguous start of the scenario
and a positive resolution, whereas in the control condition
no such contingency was established.
Data analytic approach
Sample size calculations were informed by effect sizes
(ESs) reported in the most comparable study design [28]
of a moderate between-group ES of training on inter-
pretive bias of Cohen’s d = .76. We therefore estimated
each condition to require a minimum of 22 partici-
pants per group (alpha = .05; power = .80), but more
were recruited to hedge against potential data loss. Sig-
nificance testing of group differences regarding de-
mographic data and pre-treatment measurements were
conducted using independent samples t-tests, and χ2
where the variables consisted of nominal data. General
linear model (GLM) analyses were conducted with Time
as a repeated factor and Condition as a within-subject
variable to evaluate the impact of CBM-I on the primary
outcome variables. To evaluate the potential impact of
OCD symptoms (DOCS scores) on the effect of CBM-I,
separate marginal model analyses using the restricted
maximum likelihood (REML) estimation method were
used. REML models are appropriate for pre-post only
designs [40]. Model fit was determined using Schwarz's
Bayesian Criterion (BIC). Based on the validation study
of the DOCS [41], low values of DOCS scores were
based on the mean of a healthy student sample (M = 12),
whereas high values were based on the mean of the
clinical OCD sample (M = 30). Effect sizes were cal-
culated within groups (Cohen’s d) using the pooled
standard deviation and adjusted for the repeated measure
correlation. Effect sizes for between-group comparisonswere calculated using Hedges g using the pooled stan-
dard deviation.
Results
After removal of one participant who reportedly was
receiving treatment for OCD, the final sample included
41 females and 48 males with a mean age of 35.67
(SD = 16.66). Chi-Square (χ2) and independent sam-
ples t-tests were first conducted to confirm that no
significant differences existed between participants in
the positive and control training conditions at baseline.
There were no differences in gender [χ2 (1) = .59, p > .05],
age [t(87) = 0.55, p >.05], self-report of any current anxiety
or depressive disorder [χ2 (1) = .004, p > .05], or OC symp-
toms and the baseline measures or, all ps > .05 (see Table 1
for means). Thirty-one percent of the sample scored above
the recommended clinical cut-off of 18 on the DOCS.
Data were first evaluated in terms of CBM-I training
accuracy scores to determine whether participants un-
derstood and adhered to the training condition. A target
accuracy rate of at least 75% was required. Eleven partic-
ipants (n = 2 Positive; n = 9 Control) did not obtain this
level of training accuracy and therefore were excluded
from analyses. Independent samples t-test revealed that
mean training accuracy was very high and did not differ
across the Positive (90%) and Control (89%) conditions,
p > .05. To reduce the potential for response bias to in-
fluence the results, data were also analysed with respect
to participant’s beliefs regarding the purpose of the
study. Forty-one percent (n = 32) did not report any sus-
picion regarding aspects of the study or knowledge of
the purpose of the training task. The remaining partici-
pants reported some level of suspiciousness regarding
aspects of the study. Analyses were conducted including
these participants as none were able to identify the true
purpose of the study.
To evaluate the effect of training on the primary out-
come measures univariate GLM analyses were conduc-
ted with Time as the repeated factor and Condition as
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was a main effect of Time qualified by a significant Time
by Condition interaction, [F (1, 76) = 15.02, p < .001].
Planned comparisons (see Table 2) revealed that bias
scores significantly increased in the Positive condition
(reflecting a bias away from negatively valenced interpre-
tations and towards positively valenced interpretations).
The shift in bias scores in the Control condition was not
significant. Training condition superiority over the Con-
trol condition was observed, [t(76) = 2.91, p < .01], cor-
responding to a medium effect. For Foil Bias scores, the
main effect of Time and the Time by Condition in-
teraction was not significant, although the interaction
approached significance, [F(1, 76) =3.53, p = .06].
To confirm that state mood effects could not account
for the training effect, PANAS Negativity scores were
evaluated using repeated measures GLM. There was a
main effect of Time [F (1, 75) = 15.16 p < .001], indi-
cating a reduction in negative mood following training
[M = 1.26 (SD = .37) and M = 1.28 (SD = .37) for the
Positive and Control conditions, respectively – see Table 1
for baseline means], but importantly the Time by Condi-
tion interaction was not significant, p > .05.
The impact of CBM-I on behavioural measures
For the Importance/Control of Thoughts task, indepen-
dent samples t-tests revealed a significant difference
in mean ratings of distress in the Positive (M = 3.85,
SD = .97) relative to Control condition (M = 4.32,
SD = .88) and urge to neutralize in the Positive (M = 3.37,
SD = 1.00) relative to Control condition (M = 3.86,
SD = 1.10), [t(75)s > 2.03, ps < .05], however, there was no
difference in the number of participants who elected to
erase the sentence, [χ2 (1) = .70, p > .05]. For the Perfec-
tionism/Intolerance of Uncertainty task, there were no dif-
ferences in endorsement of confidence or in the number
of participants who elected to add additional information,
[χ2 (1) = .01, p > .05]. For the Contamination/Estimation
of Threat task, there were no differences in the amount of
disinfectant wipes used in the Positive and Control con-
dition (M =1.32, SD = .57 and M =1.38, SD = .55, res-
pectively), or in the total amount of time (in seconds)Table 2 Effect of CBM-I training on bias scores across conditio
Baseline Post-training Within
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) r
Target Bias
Positive −1.82 (5.90) 5.09 (7.12) .36 7
Control −1.08 (6.92) .48 (6.82) .82
Foil Bias
Positive 2.58 (4.58) 4.04 (5.00) .59
Control 2.27 (2.73) 2.24 (4.07) .86
Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05; Within Effect Size = Cohens d; Between Effectparticipants spent cleaning the keyboard, (M = 57.64,
SD = 29.83 and 55.09, SD = 27.61, respectively), ts < .5,
ps > .05 a.
The impact of OCD symptom severity on CBM-I
To evaluate the influence of OCD symptom severity on
training outcome, marginal model analyses were then
conducted including baseline DOCS Total scores as a
covariate and as an interaction term. Analyses were
conducted separately for the Target Bias and Foil Bias
scores. For each model, time was entered as a factor and
the DOCS Total score and the time by DOCS Total
score interaction term were entered as fixed covariates.
Estimated marginal means and standard errors for the
value of Target Bias and Foil Bias scores at the level of
Low DOC scores (DOCS Total =12) and High DOCS
scores (DOCS Total = 30) are reported in Table 3 and
Figure 1. For Target Bias scores, the main effects of
Time and DOCS were qualified by a significant Time ×
Condition × DOCS interaction, [F (2, 74) = 4.67,
p < .05]. To dismantle the 3-way interaction, pairwise
contrasts were conducted. Results are reported in Table 3
that demonstrate there was a significant increase to-
wards a positive interpretation bias in the Positive group
for target scenarios, irrespective of OC status. The sig-
nificant interaction in the overall model was accounted
for by the significant increase in Target Bias scores at
the level of Low DOCS scores that was not observed at
the level of High DOCS scores in the Control condition.
For Foil Bias scores, there were no main effects or sig-
nificant interactions, all ps > .05.
Discussion
The current study aimed to extend initial research dem-
onstrating the benefit of CBM-I training on negative in-
terpretation biases associated with OC symptomatology.
We first evaluated the impact of CBM-I on measures of
interpretation bias. As predicted, community-recruited
participants assigned to the Positive CBM-I training
condition demonstrated a change in interpretation bias
towards more positive and less negative OC-relevant in-
terpretations compared to participants assigned to then
Within Within ES Between Between ES
t (df) (95% CI) t (df) (95% CI)
.27 (40)*** 1.28 (.84 – 1.71)
1.56 (36) 2.91 (76)** .66 (.20 – 1.12)
2.68 (40) .37 (−.06 – .80)
.04 (36) 2.08 (87) .38 (−.05 – .84)
Size = Hedges g.
Table 3 Effect of CBM-I training on bias scores at the level of low and high OC symptoms
Low DOCS Low DOCS High DOCS High DOCS
Baseline Post-training Baseline Post-training
E Mean (SE) E Mean (SE) E Mean (SE) E Mean (SE)
Positive training
Target Bias −1.78 (.96) 5.04 (1.03)*** −2.86 (1.64) 6.34 (1.77)***
Foil Bias 2.72 (.57) 4.06 (.68) 2.17 (.98) 5.02 (1.17)
Control training
Target Bias −.30 (1.04) 1.42 (1.12)* −5.13 (1.73) −4.43 (1.85)
Foil Bias 2.58 (.58) 2.76 (.69) 2.28 (.87) 2.14 (1.03)
Note: E Mean = estimated marginal mean. DOCS = Dimensional Obsessive Compulsive Scale; Low DOCS = 12; High DOCS = 30. ***p < .001, *p < .05. Significant
mean differences refer to baseline to post-training change in bias scores.
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with the preliminary findings of Clerkin and Teachman
[28] who reported a significant effect of CBM-I training
on OC interpretation biases in a student sample with
high OC symptoms. Importantly, there was not a corre-
sponding shift in interpretive bias to the foil scenarios
that were unrelated to the core OC belief domains, sug-
gesting specificity in the CBM-I training effect.
A further aim of the current study was to extend the
findings of the effects of CBM-I training on self-report
measures of bias to the behavioural domain. We utilized
behavioural tasks designed to tap the core belief domains
of Importance/Control of Thoughts, Perfectionism/In-
tolerance of Uncertainty, and Contamination/Estimation
of Threat. Although self-report ratings of distress and urge
to neutralize in response to the Importance/Control of
Thoughts task were lower in the Positive CBM-I condition
following training, differences were not observed between
the conditions on the behavioural index associated with
this task (deleting the accident target scenario). Additio-
nally, no differential response was evident on any of the
behavioural task measures designed to tap Perfectionism/























Low Docs High Docs
Figure 1 Estimated marginal means (standard errors) for
Target Bias scores at the level of low and high DOCS in the
positive condition.of Threat. Several explanations may account for these null
findings. Firstly, the behavioural tasks needed to be deve-
loped within the constraints of the research session and
presented in a manner to maintain participant believabi-
lity. Therefore the nature of the tasks may have prevented
sufficient levels of anxiety or OC-specific cognitions to be-
come activated. Secondly, measurements were in the form
of either a dichotomous outcome variable or a response
with limited variability, and therefore may have lacked
sensitivity to detect differences between the conditions.
Further, research demonstrates that there is often a lack of
concordance between self-report and behavioural mea-
sures. It has been suggested that behavioural measures
may capture specific aspects of behaviour that are func-
tionally distinct from the broader range of thoughts,
feelings, and self-acknowledged behaviours indexed by
self-report measures [41].
Finally, in order to demonstrate the specificity of the
observed training effect on participants most likely to be
vulnerable to maladaptive OC beliefs, we evaluated the
impact of high vs. low OC symptoms on the effects of
CBM-I. Contrary to prediction, results demonstrated that
participants in the Positive CBM-I condition evidenced a
significant shift towards more positive interpretations of
target scenarios, irrespective of OC status. Although these
results do not support a differential response to CBM-I
based on OC symptom severity, the overall results do sup-
port the specific benefit of CBM-I training on information
that is relevant to individuals with high levels of OC
symptoms. Importantly, the effects of CBM-I did not re-
flect a general positivity bias as participants did not evi-
dence a shift in interpretation bias in response to the foil
scenarios. Interestingly, results indicated a positive shift in
interpretative bias in Control condition participants who
scored in the healthy range on the DOCS. It is possible
that the degree of exposure to scenarios with a positive
resolution (in 50% of the cases) was sufficient to shift in-
terpretations of information that is unlikely to be regularly
cognitively activated by individuals with low levels of OC
symptoms (e.g., As you think about this bizarre thought,
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http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-244X/13/256you decide it is significant and says something important
about your personal values).
These results of the current study must be considered
in light of a number of limitations. The CBM-I training
session, although consisting of 164 different OC-relevant
scenarios, was delivered in a single session. It is possible
that a more protracted session, or a series of multiple
sessions delivered over several days, would be required
to impact upon behavioural responding. Future studies
would benefit from manipulations of the number of
CBM-I sessions required for optimal effects. The sample
was comprised of community members with varying
levels of OC symptoms, therefore the results may not
generalize to clinical samples of individuals with OCD.
Our research group is currently planning a series of
studies with clinical samples to ensure the effects of
CBM-I do generalize, and further, to assess whether the
effects can impact upon behavioural approach tasks that
are more representative of the concerns experienced by
clinical populations.
Conclusions
Future research should examine the utility of integrating
CBM-I paradigms with existing evidence-based interven-
tions. It has been noted by leading authorities in the
field [42] that CBM procedures lend themselves to being
delivered remotely and are cost-effective, making them
an ideal candidate for inclusion in internet-delivered
cognitive behavioural therapy (iCBT). Evidence is emer-
ging that the two types of interventions can be effectively
combined in the treatment of other clinical disorders [21],
therefore future research should aim to establish the com-
bined efficacy in the treatment of OCD. As only approxi-
mately 42% of individuals with OCD receive evidence-
based treatments [43], the need for treatment innovation
and alternative service delivery methods is clear.
Endnote
aData for 16 participants was excluded on this task due
to either participant suspicion or administrator error.
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